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A “BLIGHTED AREA” OF THE LAW: 
WHY EMINENT DOMAIN LEGISLATION IS STILL 
NECESSARY IN NEW JERSEY AFTER GALLENTHIN 
Chester R. Ostrowski ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Allen Vrabel owns the Economy Auto salvage yard in Sayreville, 
New Jersey.1  The family business, which Vrabel’s father started nearly 
fifty years ago, is thriving.2  The salvage yard sits on a parcel of land 
adjacent to the 400-acre National Lead factory site, which the bor-
ough claimed through eminent domain in 2005.3  In May 2007, act-
ing pursuant to a recommendation from its planning board, the bor-
ough council decided to add fifty-six acres to the National Lead 
redevelopment area, including properties that house an abandoned 
movie theater, an exotic dance club, a scrap metal recycling com-
pany, and Economy Auto.4  To Vrabel and the other owners, the 
council’s decision serves as a clear indication that the borough plans 
to invoke its eminent domain power to acquire the properties.5  Con-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., summa 
cum laude, 2006, The College of New Jersey.  Thank you to my sister, Sandra, for con-
tinually motivating me to work harder, to my family and friends for all of their love 
and support, and to Professor Carmella for the invaluable guidance she provided 
throughout the writing process. 
 1 Allison Steele, Sayreville Firm Sues to Stop Redevelopment, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Oct. 4, 2007, at 37. 
 2 Id.; see also Maura McDermott, Blight Is in the Eye of the Beholder, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Feb. 24, 2008, at 21. 
 3 Id.  Generally speaking, “eminent domain” is the term used to describe the 
government’s power to take private property for a public use.  2A-7 NICHOLS ON 
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1998).  This power is vested in 
the federal government by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The eminent domain power is also afforded 
to state governments as an “inherent attribute of sovereignty,” subject only to those 
limitations found in each state’s constitution or statutory law.  See NICHOLS, supra. 
 4 See Steele, supra note 1, at 37. 
 5 Id. 
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sequently, Vrabel has filed suit, asserting that his tract does not meet 
the criteria required for designation as “in need of redevelopment” 
under New Jersey law.6  However, Sayreville officials planning to re-
place the existing businesses with newly constructed stores, restau-
rants, and apartments believe that Vrabel’s land is “an essential com-
ponent in making the National Lead site a success.”7
Vrabel’s dilemma seems dreadfully common in recent years, par-
ticularly since the Supreme Court of the United States decided Kelo v. 
City of New London8 in June 2005.  In Kelo, the nation’s highest court 
expanded the government’s eminent domain power, holding that a 
municipality is permitted to use eminent domain to condemn private 
property for the sole purpose of “economic rejuvenation.”9  While 
the Court had previously upheld takings to restore a blighted area in 
Washington, D.C.,10 and to remedy a land oligopoly in Hawaii,11 it 
had never before sanctioned the transfer of unblighted property 
from one private owner to another for purely economic reasons. 
Both Berman v. Parker12 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff13 
produced somewhat narrower holdings.  In Berman, the Supreme 
Court held that the proposed redevelopment of “substandard hous-
ing and blighted areas”14 constituted a valid “public purpose” under 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.15  Nearly thirty years 
 6 Id.; see generally Local Redevelopment Housing Law (LRHL), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
40A:12A-1 to -49 (West 1992). 
 7 Steele, supra note 1, at 37. 
 8 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 9 Id. at 483–84.  While the majority gave great weight to the fact that the City 
proposed a “carefully considered,” comprehensive plan, it remains to be seen 
whether this factor is truly a prerequisite for Kelo-style takings. 
 10 See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  “Blight” has been defined as 
“an area in which deteriorating forces have obviously reduced economic and social 
values to such a degree that widespread rehabilitation is necessary to forestall the de-
velopment of an actual slum condition.”  MABEL L. WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 
5 (1938), quoted in Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 
447, 457 (N.J. 2007).  More recently, blight has been described as “an area, usually in 
a city, that is in transition from a state of relative civic health to the state of being a 
slum, a breeding ground for crime, disease, and unhealthful living conditions.”  
Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 393 (2000), quoted in Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 457. 
 11 See generally Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 12 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 13 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 14 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. 
 15 Id. at 35–36.  Note that the Berman Court strengthened the government’s 
power to exercise eminent domain by broadly reading “public use” as found in the 
Fifth Amendment to mean “public purpose.”  See id. at 32.  In addition, the Court 
conceded that “[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an agency 
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later, the Midkiff Court held that Hawaii’s desire to eliminate “certain 
perceived evils of concentrated property ownership” was a legitimate 
public purpose, which similarly satisfied the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause.16  The Court in Midkiff noted in its conclusion, however, 
that “[a] purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the 
public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of gov-
ernment and would thus be void.”17
According to Justice O’Connor, the type of purely private taking 
described in Midkiff was exactly what the City of New London had 
planned in Kelo.18  Dissenting from the majority opinion written by 
Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor argued that the Court’s determina-
tion effectively eliminated the “public use” requirement from the 
Constitution by allowing the government to take any property and 
transfer it to a private owner so long as it might be used “in a way that 
the legislature deems more beneficial to the public.”19  Under the 
Court’s ruling, Justice O’Connor opined, “Nothing is to prevent the 
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a 
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”20
As evidenced by Justice O’Connor’s dissent, one can interpret 
Kelo as opening the door for municipalities nationwide to seize pri-
vate property for economic redevelopment purposes, even if the 
property itself is not blighted.  Justice Stevens made clear, however, 
that states are free to adopt their own restrictions on the use of emi-
nent domain.21  Justice Stevens further noted that, at the time Kelo 
was decided, many states had already chosen to impose “public use” 
requirements stricter than those imposed by the federal govern-
ment.22  New Jersey adopted such requirements in 1947, when a State 
Constitutional Convention incorporated “blight” into the New Jersey 
of private enterprise than through a department of government—or so the Congress 
might conclude.  We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promot-
ing the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”  Id. at 33–34. 
 16 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.  In Midkiff, the Court reaffirmed the “public purpose” 
standard, as well as the legislature’s broad discretion to determine what constitutes a 
valid “public purpose.”  Id. at 240.  For a more thorough discussion concerning the 
development of the “public use test,” see Jonathan Michels, Comment, Kelo v. City of 
New London: Is the Response to Curb the Effect of the Supreme Court Decision Going Too 
Far?, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 528–35 (2007). 
 17 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. 
 18 See Edward J. Trawinski, Kelo Ruling: Destroying the American Dream, N.J. LAW., 
July 4, 2005, at 7. 
 19 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
 20 Id. at 503. 
 21 Id. at 489 (majority opinion). 
 22 Id. 
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Constitution.23  The so-called “blighted areas clause,” which provides 
that “redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and 
public use, for which private property may be taken or acquired,”24 
has been interpreted to limit the use of eminent domain for redevel-
opment to only those areas that can properly be described as 
“blighted.”25  For this reason, it is clear that the takings upheld in Kelo 
would not have been permitted in New Jersey.26
Despite the blight requirement, however, New Jersey municipali-
ties have historically experienced little difficulty in exercising emi-
nent domain for redevelopment.  For decades leading up to Kelo, 
New Jersey courts showed such great deference to the broad defini-
tions of “blight” prescribed by the legislature that municipalities and 
other entities possessing eminent domain powers were permitted to 
seize property for redevelopment purposes with relative ease.27  Nev-
ertheless, it took the Supreme Court’s well-publicized decision in Kelo 
to bring the various issues surrounding eminent domain to the atten-
tion of New Jersey residents. 
After Kelo, New Jerseyans began to take a closer look at the way 
and extent to which eminent domain was being used throughout the 
state.  One source reported that nearly one thousand redevelopment 
projects, including thirty in Jersey City alone, were ongoing in New 
Jersey when the Supreme Court decided Kelo in 2005.28  Another re-
ported that since 2003 nearly seventy New Jersey towns had estab-
lished redevelopment areas.29  The public outcry that resulted from 
 23 See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (1947). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Howard Geneslaw & Susanne Peticolas, Dealing with Kelo: New Jersey Legisla-
ture Considers Redevelopment Reforms, NJPA REAL EST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at 1; Elisa Ung, 
Ruling Tightens N.J. Land Seizure, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 14, 2007, at B9. 
 26 N.J. DEP’T OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR 
PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW JERSEY 5 (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/ 
publicadvocate/home/reports/pdfs/PAReportOnEminentDomainForPrivateRedeve 
lopment.pdf [hereinafter REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN].  The Court in 
Kelo specifically found that “[t]hose who govern the City were not confronted with 
the need to remove blight.”  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. 
 27 See Richard Buck, Thou Art Condemned: How New Jersey Courts Are Sacrificing Pri-
vate Landowners on the Altar of Eminent Domain, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 330, 341 
(2005); Hon. Peter G. Sheridan, Kelo v. City of New London: New Jersey’s Take on Tak-
ings, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 307, 325–26 (2007). 
 28 See Dana E. Sullivan, Lawyers: Halt Anti-Kelo Stampede, N.J. LAW., Nov. 14, 2005, 
at 3. 
 29 Elisa Ung, N.J. Seizes Initiative on Eminent Domain, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 20, 
2006, at B1.  For a discussion of several recent cases involving the use of eminent 
domain in New Jersey, see N.J. DEP’T OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, IN NEED OF 
REDEVELOPMENT: REPAIRING NEW JERSEY’S EMINENT DOMAIN LAWS (2007), available at 
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Kelo encouraged political debate and stimulated bipartisan support 
for eminent domain reform.30  Like those in many other states, New 
Jersey legislators and judges were called upon to reevaluate the state’s 
position on takings.  Legislators responded by introducing reform 
bills, while trial courts simultaneously began to limit their previously 
broad authorization of eminent domain use.31
Finally, in June 2007, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided 
Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro,32 marking the 
first time since Kelo that the state’s highest court ruled on a case in-
volving eminent domain.33  In Gallenthin, the court held that the 
“New Jersey Constitution does not permit government redevelop-
ment of private property solely because the property is not used in an 
optimal manner.”34  Rather, the court concluded, the property must 
be truly blighted before it can be designated as “in need of redevel-
opment.”35  In this way, Gallenthin restored some vigor to the blighted 
areas clause and strengthened the growing trend within the state ju-
diciary towards narrowing New Jersey’s historically broad allowance of 
eminent domain. 
While the court’s decision in Gallenthin was a laudable step for 
New Jersey in its treatment of eminent domain issues, this Comment 
focuses on why reform legislation remains necessary even after Gallen-
thin.  Part II provides a brief history of takings in New Jersey prior to 
the Kelo decision, focusing on the use of eminent domain in the re-
development context.  Part III explores Kelo’s impact within the state, 
including both the public reaction and the governmental response.  
Part IV describes the facts that gave rise to the dispute in Gallenthin, 
and then discusses what the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately 
held.  Part V examines various state trial and appellate court cases de-
cided after Gallenthin in which the judiciary has continued to con-
strict the power of municipalities to invoke eminent domain, as well 
as the State Legislature’s failure to pass any meaningful reform legis-
http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/home/reports/pdfs/Eminent%20Domain-
Color.pdf [hereinafter IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT]. 
 30 See Robert G. Seidenstein, Eminent Domain: Trenton Tackling This Thorny Issue, 
N.J. LAW., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1, 31; Sullivan, supra note 28, at 3; Ung, supra note 29, at 
B1; see also infra Part III.B. 
 31 See infra Part III.B. 
 32 924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007). 
 33 See Ung, supra note 25, at B9.  Gallenthin was also the first eminent domain case 
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court since the State Legislature passed the Lo-
cal Redevelopment Housing Law in 1992.  Jeffrey S. Beenstock, New Jersey Supreme 
Court Limits Scope of Redevelopment Law, N.J. REAL EST. ALERT, June 27, 2007, at 1. 
 34 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 465. 
 35 See id. 
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lation since Gallenthin was decided.  Finally, Part VI attempts to pre-
dict the future of jurisprudence in this realm and provides recom-
mendations for immediate legislative action, including the adoption 
of alternative measures of “just compensation,” a more exacting des-
ignation process, and stricter ethical limitations. 
II. EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW JERSEY PRIOR TO KELO 
Like its federal counterpart, the New Jersey Constitution pro-
vides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.”36  This provision imposes two primary limita-
tions on the State’s power to take private property.37  First, the State 
may use its eminent domain power to take private property only for a 
“public use.”38  Second, the State is required to pay “just compensa-
tion” for all property taken through eminent domain.39
In New Jersey, the “public use” requirement has been relatively 
well-settled since the early 1900s.  In Mansfield & Swelt Inc. v. Town of 
West Orange,40 Justice Heher declared: 
The state possesses the inherent authority—it antedates the Con-
stitution—to resort, in the building and expansion of its commu-
nity life, to such measures as may be necessary to secure the essen-
tial common material and moral needs.  The public welfare is of 
prime importance; and the correlative restrictions upon individ-
ual rights—either of person or of property—are incidents of the 
social order, considered a negligible loss compared with the resul-
tant advantages to the community as a whole.41
While Mansfield & Swelt involved a municipality’s exercise of the po-
lice power rather than eminent domain,42 New Jersey courts have 
since adopted a broad view of the “public use” requirement in accor-
dance with the state supreme court’s declaration in that case.43
 36 Compare N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 20 (providing that “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation”), with U.S. CONST. amend. V (pro-
viding that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation”). 
 37 See N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 20; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE 
CONSTITUTION 47–48, 71 (1997). 
 38 See N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 20; Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 90–
91 (N.J. 2002) (citing State v. Heppenheimer, 23 A. 664 (N.J. 1892)). 
 39 See N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 20. 
 40 198 A. 225 (N.J. 1938). 
 41 Id. at 229. 
 42 Id. at 229–30. 
 43 See Sheridan, supra note 27, at 326. 
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The true authority to determine what constitutes a valid public 
use, however, lies with the legislature.  In fact, the authority to pro-
vide for the exercise of eminent domain has “been allotted to the leg-
islative branch of the government since the Magna Carta.”44  Courts 
have routinely held that “constitutions do not give, but merely place 
limitations upon, the power of eminent domain which otherwise 
would be without limitation.”45  The legislature’s authority to pass 
enabling legislation is therefore limited “only by the pertinent clauses 
of [the] Constitution,”46 and state courts are obliged to defer to all 
such legislative determinations. 
In New Jersey, the Legislature has delegated the eminent do-
main power to numerous state agencies as well as the state’s various 
political subdivisions.47  In the mid-1940s, the Legislature began using 
its authority to provide for the exercise of eminent domain directed 
at “slum clearance.”48  The 1944 Redevelopment Companies Law 
(RCL), for example, sought to promote redevelopment of areas 
plagued by substandard and unsanitary living conditions “owing to 
obsolescence, deterioration and dilapidation of buildings, or exces-
sive land coverage, lack of planning, of public facilities, of sufficient 
light, air and space, and improper design and arrangement of living 
quarters.”49  Similarly, the 1946 Urban Redevelopment Law (URL) 
was designed to remedy “congested, dilapidated, substandard, un-
sanitary and dangerous housing conditions.”50  However, neither the 
RCL nor the URL was successful in securing private investment be-
cause builders feared that the statutes would be declared unconstitu-
tional under the “public use” requirement.51
To alleviate the private investors’ concerns, the 1947 Constitu-
tional Convention decided to incorporate “blight” into the New Jer-
 44 Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass’n, 100 A.2d 532, 540 (N.J. 1953) (citations 
omitted). 
 45 Id.; see also City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 
404–07 (1912). 
 46 Abbott, 100 A.2d at 540. 
 47 Id. at 541; see also Sheridan, supra note 27, at 329–30 (noting that, in addition 
to municipalities, county improvement authorities and various other agencies in New 
Jersey possess condemnation powers, including the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey, the Delaware River Port Authority, the New Jersey Economic Develop-
ment Authority, and the New Jersey Educational Facility Authority). 
 48 Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 458 (N.J. 
2007). 
 49 Id. (citing L. 1944, c. 169, § 2). 
 50 Id. (citing L. 1946, c. 52, § 2). 
 51 Id. (citing 1 Proceedings of the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 744 
[hereinafter Proceedings]). 
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sey Constitution.52  The blighted areas clause, which is unlike any pro-
vision in the U.S. Constitution, expressly authorizes the government 
to seize blighted property for redevelopment purposes.53  Specifically, 
the provision provides that “[t]he clearance, replanning, develop-
ment, or redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose 
and public use, for which private property may be taken or ac-
quired.”54
The Framers of the blighted areas clause intended the provision 
to enable rehabilitation of the state’s older cities.55  In particular, the 
Framers sought to address deterioration in “certain sections” of those 
cities, which had been causing an “economic domino effect” to the 
detriment of surrounding properties.56  Since the provision was rati-
fied, however, New Jersey courts have “liberally authorized the use of 
eminent domain,”57 effectively expanding the definition of blight be-
yond the Framers’ original intent. 
Wilson v. City of Long Branch58 illustrates this point.  In Wilson, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an extremely broad definition of 
“blight” that the Legislature prescribed when it enacted the Blighted 
Areas Act (BAA).59  Under the BAA, property could be considered 
blighted if it met the following criteria: “[a] growing or total lack of 
proper utilization of areas caused by the condition of title, diverse 
ownership of real property therein and other conditions, resulting in 
stagnant and unproductive condition of land potentially useful and 
valuable for contributing to and serving the public health, safety and 
welfare.”60  The court, emphasizing the importance of community re-
development, found that this definition was acceptable under the 
New Jersey Constitution.61  In Levin v. Township Committee of Bridge-
water,62 the court expanded the meaning of blight even further, hold-
 52 Id.; see also McClintock v. City of Trenton, 219 A.2d 510, 511 (N.J. 1966) (not-
ing that the blighted areas clause “was adopted to remove any doubts with regard to 
earlier pertinent legislation”). 
 53 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, §3, ¶ 1 (1947). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 458 (citing Proceedings, supra note 51, at 744). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Sheridan, supra note 27, at 325.  But see Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. 
Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 110–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (holding that the pro-
posed taking was improper because it primarily served a private developer rather 
than the public interest). 
 58 142 A.2d 837 (N.J. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958). 
 59 See Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 458 (citing Wilson, 142 A.2d at 842–49). 
 60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-21.1(e) (repealed 1992). 
 61 See Wilson, 142 A.2d at 842–49. 
 62 274 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1971). 
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ing that “the BAA applied to more than just ‘slum clearance.’”63  
More precisely, the Levin court held that the Act authorized public 
agencies to undertake “urban, suburban and rural redevelopment, to 
acquire land for that purpose and to make it available for redevelop-
ment by private enterprise or by public agencies in accordance with 
approved redevelopment plans.”64
Over the years, the State Legislature has also done its part to ex-
pand the definition of “blight.”65  The most obvious occurrence was 
when the Legislature repealed the already expansive BAA and re-
placed it with the Local Redevelopment Housing Law (LRHL) in 
1992.66  Under the LRHL, the governing body of any municipality in 
the state may designate an area as “in need of redevelopment if, after 
investigation, notice and hearing,” it concludes, by resolution, that 
one of eight conditions exist.67  The designation of an area as “in 
 63 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 459 (citing Levin, 274 A.2d at 4). 
 64 Levin, 274 A.2d at 4. 
 65 See IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 4. 
 66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-1 to -49 (West 1992). 
 67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 provides the eight criteria for redevelopment des-
ignations: 
a. The generality of buildings are substandard, unsafe, unsanitary, di-
lapidated, or obsolescent, or possess any of such characteristics, or 
are so lacking in light, air, or space, as to be conducive to unwhole-
some living or working conditions. 
b. The discontinuance of the use of the buildings previously used for 
commercial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes; the abandon-
ment of such buildings; or the same being allowed to fall into so 
great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable. 
c. Land that is owned by the municipality, the county, a local housing 
authority, redevelopment agency or redevelopment entity, or un-
improved vacant land that has remained so for a period of ten years 
prior to adoption of the resolution, and that by reason of its loca-
tion, remoteness, lack of means of access to developed sections or 
portions of the municipality, or topography, or nature of the soil, is 
not likely to be developed through the instrumentality of private 
capital. 
d. Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapida-
tion, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, 
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land cover-
age, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of 
these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, 
or welfare of the community. 
e. A growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused by 
the condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real property 
therein or other conditions, resulting in stagnant or not fully pro-
ductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for con-
tributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare. 
f. Areas, in excess of five contiguous acres, whereon buildings or im-
provements have been destroyed, consumed by fire, demolished or 
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need of redevelopment” under any of the eight criteria is equivalent 
to a “blight” designation under the New Jersey Constitution.68
The LRHL’s broad criteria seemingly provide only a slight limi-
tation on the taking of private property for redevelopment pur-
poses.69  Moreover, once a municipality has determined that certain 
property is “in need of redevelopment,” that determination carries 
with it a presumption of validity.70  A property owner may overcome 
the presumption of validity by demonstrating that the municipality’s 
determination was not supported by substantial evidence.71  Under 
the weight of this heavy burden, however, property owners have 
rarely been successful and courts have routinely upheld redevelop-
ment designations.72
In the late 1990s, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided two 
cases that signaled a potential shift in favor of property owners.  In 
City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments,73 the court “suggested that 
condemnations resulting in a substantial benefit to private parties 
demanded heightened scrutiny because ‘the condemnation process 
involves one of the most awesome powers of government.’”74  The fol-
altered by the action of storm, fire, cyclone, tornado, earthquake or 
other casualty in such a way that the aggregate assessed value of the 
area has been materially depreciated. 
g. In any municipality in which an enterprise zone has been desig-
nated pursuant to the “New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zones Act,” 
P.L. 1983, c. 303 (C. 52:27H-60 et seq.) the execution of the actions 
prescribed in that act for the adoption by the municipality and ap-
proval by the New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zone Authority of the 
zone development plan for the area of the enterprise zone shall be 
considered sufficient for the determination that the area is in need 
of redevelopment . . . . 
h. The designation of the delineated area is consistent with smart 
growth planning principles adopted pursuant to law or legislation. 
Id. 
 68 See Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor of Princeton, 851 A.2d 685, 
689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Forbes v. Bd. of Trustees, 712 A.2d 255, 257–60 
(N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).  
 69 REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 15. 
 70 See Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1971). 
 71 Id. at 18 (citing Wilson v. Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 854 (N.J. 1958)). 
 72 See Concerned Citizens of Princeton, 851 A.2d at 689 (upholding the borough 
council’s redevelopment designation, finding that there was “substantial credible 
evidence in the record” supporting the determination that plaintiffs’ properties con-
stituted an area “in need of redevelopment” under the LRHL); Forbes, 712 A.2d at 
257 (holding that the record provided substantial evidence to support the municipal-
ity’s decision to create a “central business district redevelopment area” and to adopt 
a redevelopment plan for that area). 
 73 689 A.2d 712 (N.J. 1997). 
 74 See Buck, supra note 27, at 347–48 (citing Cynwyd, 689 A.2d at 721). 
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lowing year, in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin,75 a 
state superior court held that, despite the usual deference afforded 
redevelopment designations, a proposal by Donald Trump to build a 
parking lot for a new hotel and casino in Atlantic City did not satisfy 
the “public use” requirement.76  The purpose of the taking, the court 
found, was not clear at the time the State sought to condemn the 
property.77  Perhaps more importantly, the court emphasized that the 
proposed taking was invalid because the private benefit clearly over-
whelmed the public benefit.78
Unfortunately, however, the property owners’ success in Cynwyd 
and Banin did not translate into more protective rulings for future 
plaintiffs.  In fact, in upholding the property owners’ challenge in 
Banin, the court rejected the proposition that the Cynwyd court estab-
lished “a new ‘heightened scrutiny’ standard of review.”79  In 2002, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed this denial of a heightened 
standard in Township of West Orange v. 769 Associates.80  The court in 
769 Associates reverted back to a broad interpretation of the “public 
use” requirement and suggested that it would not interfere with deci-
sions to use eminent domain in the absence of “fraud, bad faith or 
manifest abuse.”81
III. FROM KELO TO GALLENTHIN 
Part II of this Comment suggests that New Jersey “liberally au-
thorized the use of eminent domain”82 for a wide range of public uses 
and benefits even prior to Kelo.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kelo, therefore, should not have come as a surprise to New Jersey 
residents.83  But “[d]espite hundreds of similar takings in New Jersey 
 75 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998). 
 76 Id. at 103–11. 
 77 Id. at 111. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 104. 
 80 800 A.2d 86 (N.J. 2002).  Specifically, the court stated, “Notwithstanding that 
the ‘heightened scrutiny’ language in Cynwyd . . . is dicta, . . . we have never held that 
the standard is other than the manifest abuse of discretion test.” Id. at 94. 
 81 Id. at 90 (citing City of Trenton v. Lezner, 109 A.2d 409, 413 (N.J. 1954)). 
 82 Sheridan, supra note 27, at 325; see also Edward D. McKirdy, The New Eminent 
Domain: Public Use Defense Vanishing in Wake of Growing Privatization of Power, 155 N.J. 
L.J. 1145, 1145 (1999) (noting the evolution of “public use” from a narrow definition 
to a broad definition allowing governments to transfer land from one private owner 
to another for use in profit-making projects). 
 83 See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 3 (noting redevelopment lawyers’ recognition 
that the Kelo decision was “in line with previous rulings” and reflected what has “been 
happening for decades—without much fuss”); Edward McManimon, Local Govern-
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over the years,”84 the Kelo decision served as the catalyst that finally 
brought eminent domain issues to the attention of New Jersey resi-
dents.  The Court’s ruling prompted a significant public outcry both 
in New Jersey and throughout the nation,85 as well as an immediate 
response from various state courts and legislatures.86  In New Jersey, 
the judiciary was quick to respond to Kelo’s potentially sweeping 
mandate.  Legislators, on the other hand, failed to pass any new legis-
lation dealing with eminent domain issues, notwithstanding the ap-
parent bipartisan support for reform. 
A. Public Reaction to Kelo 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent had a particularly significant impact 
on the public reaction to Kelo.  According to Justice O’Connor, the 
Court’s decision eliminated a fundamental limitation on the govern-
ment’s power to use eminent domain.87  In the past, Justice 
O’Connor asserted, the Court upheld takings for subsequent transfer 
to private persons only in limited circumstances.88  In her view, how-
ever, the majority ruling in this case gave the government authority to 
seize any private property for transfer to another private owner based 
solely on “predicted” and “incidental” benefits to the public—that is, 
so long as the property might be used “in a way the legislature deems 
more beneficial to the public.”89  Justice O’Connor concluded that if 
such a broad justification would suffice, “then the words ‘for public 
ments Need the Power of Eminent Domain, N.J. MUNICIPALITIES, Oct. 2005, at 68–70, avail-
able at http://www.njslom.org/magart1005_page68.html (stating that the adverse re-
action to Kelo was surprising “in light of the long and clear history of the use of both 
redevelopment and eminent domain in revitalizing . . . blighted properties”). 
 84 Dana E. Sullivan, Eminent Domain: Milgram Joins Chorus for Reform, N.J. LAW., 
Aug. 13, 2007, at 3. 
 85 See infra Part II.A. 
 86 See infra Part II.B. 
 87 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
 88 Id. at 497–98.  More specifically, Justice O’Connor argued that private property 
rights ought to prevail over eminent domain unless the condemnation fits within one 
of three categories.  Id.  First, the government can condemn private property for 
public ownership, such as for building a road or a public school.  Id.  Second, the 
government can transfer property from one private party to another, so long as the 
property is actually used by the public.  Id.  A condemnation in which property is 
transferred to a common carrier (such as a railroad), or to a public utility (such as a 
water, gas, or electricity provider) would satisfy the actual public use test.  Id.  Finally, 
the government is permitted to condemn private property if “the extraordinary, pre-
condemnation use of the targeted property inflicts affirmative harm on society.”  Id. 
at 500.  According to Justice O’Connor, New London’s redevelopment plan failed to 
fit into any of these categories.  Id. 
 89 Id. at 494, 501. 
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use’ do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert 
any constraint on the eminent domain power.”90  Under the major-
ity’s decision, she declared, “[n]othing is to prevent the State from 
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory.”91
In Kelo’s wake, property owners throughout the United States 
began to echo the concerns articulated in Justice O’Connor’s dis-
sent.92  In New Jersey, residents and business owners expressed con-
cerns about the frequency in which private property was “being 
grabbed . . . at a low cost and turned over to a developer.”93  The Cas-
tle Coalition, which monitors government takings throughout the na-
tion, ranked New Jersey among the worst eminent domain abusers 
based on its finding that nearly seventy towns had established rede-
velopment areas between 2003 and 2006.94  According to another 
source, nearly one thousand redevelopment projects were ongoing in 
New Jersey when Kelo was decided in 2005.95  With the State quickly 
earning a reputation for what some called “redevelopment abuse,”96 
the New Jersey Coalition Against Eminent Domain Abuse called for a 
moratorium on eminent domain use for economic redevelopment.97
B. Governmental Response to Kelo 
Legislators, judges, and politicians clearly heard the public out-
cry, which resulted in bipartisan support for eminent domain reform 
both at the state level and at the federal level.98  After Kelo, Republi-
 90 Id. at 501. 
 91 Id. at 503. 
 92 See, e.g., Kenton Robinson, Protesters from New Jersey to Maine Voice Displeasure, 
THEDAY.COM, July 6, 2005, available at http://www.housegop.state.ct.us/eminent 
domain/day_article_07062005_002.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2008).  In the weeks 
following the Kelo decision, protestors from various states gathered outside New 
London’s City Hall to voice their disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decision.  Id.  
Property owner Steve Pudlow expressed his fear that “no property owner is safe.  If a 
Hooters can pay more taxes, then you can be tossed out to make room for Hooters.”  
Id.  Kathleen Maroney, a New York City resident, stated that “[t]he American Dream 
is now shattered.”  Id. 
 93 Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 1. 
 94 Ung, supra note 29, at B1. 
 95 See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 3. 
 96 See Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31; Ung, supra note 29, at B1; see also IN NEED 
OF REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 4 (identifying “recurring abuses” in eminent 
domain cases). 
 97 Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31. 
 98 See Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31 (asserting that the eminent domain issue is 
“one that unites elements of the right and the left”); Sullivan, supra note 28, at 3 
(noting that Kelo “triggered a public outcry that was definitely heard by politicians” 
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cans championed stricter eminent domain criteria based on “the 
sanctity of private property” rights.99  At the same time, Democrats 
supported restrictions as a means to protect the poor and the elderly, 
who happen to own a significant portion of the property taken by the 
government for redevelopment.100  Due to the overwhelming senti-
ment in favor of reform, it took Congress less than six months to en-
act the first piece of legislation designed to limit the effects of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.101
Some state legislatures similarly responded to Kelo by imposing 
restraints on the use of eminent domain for private redevelopment.102  
Others opted for an outright ban on takings for this purpose.103  In 
New Jersey, legislators were not so quick to act.  While both the As-
sembly and the Senate considered several bills introduced in direct 
and that the House of Representatives passed a bill disallowing federal funds for di-
rect or indirect use for projects using eminent domain for private redevelopment by 
an overwhelming 376-38 vote); Duncan Currie, Life After Kelo, AMERICAN, June 8, 
2007, available at http://www.american.com/archive/2007/june-0607/life-after-kelo 
(stating that the eminent domain debate “defies polarization and party line bicker-
ing”); Kenneth Harney, House Bill Would Limit Taking of Private Land, BALT. SUN, Nov. 
6, 2005, at 1L; Greg Simmons, Bipartisan Support for Eminent Domain Reform, FOX 
NEWS, Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,169926,00. 
html; Ung, supra note 29, at B1. 
 99 See Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31.  But see Currie, supra note 98 (noting that 
“not all Republicans have joined the pro-reform chorus” as the “big business wing 
tends to prefer broad eminent domain powers for municipalities,” which allow “lu-
crative redevelopment schemes” to move forward). 
 100 See Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31; see also Clarence Page, Eminent Domain 
Land Grabs Hit the Poor, Minorities Hardest, BALT. SUN, Oct. 5, 2007, at 15A (referenc-
ing an Institute for Justice study finding that displacement by “eminent domain tends 
to hit the poor, less well-educated and nonwhite”). 
 101 See Michels, supra note 16, at 544–45.  An amendment to the Transportation, 
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of Colum-
bia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 Stat. 
2396 (2005), signed into law by President Bush on November 30, 2005, disallows the 
use of federal transportation funds for projects that involve taking private property 
for economic redevelopment and that primarily benefit private entities.  Id. (citing 
Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 2494–2495). 
 102 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.0001 (Vernon 2005) (prohibiting parties 
entrusted with the eminent domain power from taking private property for the bene-
fit of a particular private party). 
 103 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 98.  After Kelo, Florida outlawed the use of eminent 
domain for any kind of private development and South Carolina residents voted for a 
constitutional amendment that banned private-to-private transfers and tightened cri-
teria for designating property as blighted.  Id.  New Hampshire voters similarly 
agreed that “no part of a person’s property shall be taken by eminent domain and 
transferred, directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking is for the purpose 
of private development or other private use of the property.”  Id.  In addition, South 
Dakota outlawed the use of eminent domain for private redevelopment under any 
circumstances.  REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 4. 
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response to Kelo,104 none of the proposed statutes gained enough 
support to be enacted. 
To the contrary, New Jersey trial courts immediately began to 
limit the judiciary’s previously broad authorization of eminent do-
main use.  Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Kelo, the state ju-
diciary began to shift from a long line of cases ruling in favor of the 
government’s power105 to a narrower view of public use and blight—
one more protective of New Jersey property owners.106  In April 2007, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court was finally called upon to examine a 
case involving eminent domain. 
IV. THE GALLENTHIN DECISION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s June 2007 decision in Gallen-
thin marked the first time since Kelo, as well as the first time since the 
State Legislature passed the LRHL in 1992, that the state’s highest 
court ruled on an eminent domain issue.107  Observers wondered 
whether the court would continue the new superior court trend fa-
voring property owners or revert back to the judiciary’s pre-Kelo lais-
sez-faire approach.  As discussed below, the former approach would 
prevail. 
A. The Facts 
Plaintiffs Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc., George A. 
Gallenthin III, and Cindy Gallenthin owned a sixty-three-acre parcel 
in the Borough of Paulsboro with clear, quieted title.108  The land, 
which was comprised mostly of undeveloped open space, had histori-
 104 See infra Part V.B.; Geneslaw & Peticolas, supra note 25, at 1; Ung, supra note 
29, at B1. 
 105 See Sheridan, supra note 27, at 331; supra text accompanying notes 57–81. 
 106 See, e.g., ERETC v. City of Perth Amboy, 885 A.2d 512, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005) (reversing redevelopment designation because the planning board’s deci-
sion was not supported by substantial evidence); LBK Assocs. v. Borough of Lodi, 
Docket No. BER-8766-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005) (invalidating redevelopment 
designation because there existed “a complete lack of detailed specific proofs as to 
why [the] property should be designated as in need of redevelopment”); Twp. of 
Bloomfield v. 110 Washington St. Assocs., Docket No. ESX-L-2318-05, at 6 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (dismissing the township’s redevelopment designation in 
part because the record “is devoid of any finding that the property is detrimental to 
the public health, safety or welfare”). 
 107 See Beenstock, supra note 33, at 1; Ung, supra note 25, at B9. 
 108 Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 449–50 
(N.J. 2007). 
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cally been used as a deposit site for dredging materials.109  Besides us-
ing the property sporadically as a dredging depot, plaintiffs leased 
portions of the property in 1997 and 1998 to an environmental clean-
up organization that used the property for river access and storage, as 
well as an employee parking lot.110  In addition, plaintiffs harvested a 
wild-growing reed, used as cattle feed and recognized by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency as actively neutralizing soil pollutants, 
from the property three times a year beginning in 1997.111
Despite the fact that the property was being used in this way, 
Paulsboro officials sought to designate the Gallenthin property as “in 
need of redevelopment.”  In April 2003, the Borough’s Planning 
Board held a public hearing pursuant to the LRHL to determine 
whether such a designation would be proper.112  While the Board’s 
professional planner and the plaintiffs’ planning expert provided 
conflicting testimony, the Board ultimately concluded that the prop-
erty should be included in the previously established BP/Dow Rede-
velopment Area.113  Paulsboro’s Governing Board adopted the Plan-
ning Board’s recommendation in May 2003, officially designating the 
Gallenthin property as part of an area “in need of redevelopment” 
and thereby subjecting it to the Borough’s eminent domain power.114
Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, 
challenging the redevelopment designation.115  The Law Division 
dismissed the complaint, however, finding that Paulsboro “meticu-
lously adhered” to the LRHL’s procedural requirements and that the 
inclusion of the Gallenthin property in the redevelopment plan “was 
supported by substantial evidence.”116  The Appellate Division af-
firmed, prompting plaintiffs to petition the New Jersey Supreme 
Court for certification.117  Upon the court’s grant of certification,118 
 109 Id. at 450.  Beginning in 1902, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers made various 
dredging deposits on the Gallenthin property.  Id.  While the last deposit was made 
in 1963, plaintiffs contended that they could still use the property for dredging, a pe-
riodic activity that typically “occurs every thirty-five years or so as the need arises.”  Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 452. 
 113 Id.  The BP/Dow Redevelopment Area consisted of a British Petroleum stor-
age facility bordering the Gallenthin property as well as an adjacent property owned 
by Dow/Essex Chemical.  Id. 
 114 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 453. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 453–54. 
 118 Id. at 454 (citing Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 909 
A.2d 727, 727 (N.J. 2006)). 
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plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of New Jersey Statutes An-
notated section 40A:12A-5(e) as applied to their property and further 
maintained that their property could not be included as part of the 
larger BP/Dow Redevelopment Area “under the guise that the parcel 
is necessary for the overall redevelopment initiative.”119  Moreover, 
plaintiffs claimed that both lower courts incorrectly applied the sub-
stantial evidence standard of review.120
B. The New Jersey High Court’s Decision 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first considered whether Pauls-
boro’s interpretation of section 40A:12A-5(e) violated the New Jersey 
Constitution.121  Plaintiffs argued that the designation of their prop-
erty as “in need of redevelopment” under subsection (e) was unten-
able because the constitutional requirement of “blight” was not satis-
fied.122  According to the plaintiffs, “blight” carries negative 
connotations that their property did not possess.123  To the contrary, 
Paulsboro argued that “the [c]onstitution delegates responsibility for 
defining the term ‘blighted area’ to the Legislature, which provided 
clear guidance by enacting the Local Redevelopment and Housing 
Law.”124  The town asserted that, under the plain language of subsec-
tion (e), its Planning Board had the authority to designate property 
as “in need of redevelopment” so long as it was “stagnant or not fully 
productive.”125
At the outset, the court recognized that the New Jersey Constitu-
tion’s blighted areas clause authorized the Legislature to enact the 
LRHL.126  The LRHL, in turn, delegates to municipalities the power 
to designate property as “in need of redevelopment.”127  In designat-
ing the Gallenthin property in this case, Paulsboro relied on section 
40A:12A-5(e) of the LRHL, which permits a municipality to classify 
land as “in need of redevelopment” if it finds 
a growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused 
by the condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real prop-
erty therein or other conditions, resulting in a stagnant or not fully 
 119 Id. 
 120 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 454. 
 121 Id. at 456. 
 122 Id. at 454. 
 123 Id. at 454. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 455. 
 127 Id.  The municipality can then use eminent domain to acquire property desig-
nated as “in need of redevelopment.”  See supra text accompanying notes 66–72. 
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productive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for 
contributing to and serving the public health, safety and wel-
fare.128
In support of its position, Paulsboro argued that the phrase “other 
conditions” in the statute refers to any possible condition and that 
the “stagnant or not fully productive” language creates two alternative 
criteria, each sufficient to warrant a redevelopment designation.129
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Zazzali observed 
that the blighted areas clause “operates as both a grant and limit on 
the State’s redevelopment authority.”130  After a long discussion re-
garding the meaning of “blight,” Chief Justice Zazzali concluded that 
while its meaning has evolved, the term “still has a negative connota-
tion” and “retains its essential characteristic: deterioration or stagna-
tion that negatively affects surrounding property.”131  This articula-
tion, he stated, is consistent with other states’ statutory definitions of 
blight.132  Specifically, Chief Justice Zazzali noted that only eight states 
“permit local governments to classify property as ‘blighted’ based on 
economic evaluation of the property’s use,”133 and even the courts 
within those jurisdictions generally hold that a lack of “fully produc-
tive” use, without more, is insufficient to condemn the property as 
blighted.134
The court found that Paulsboro’s interpretation of section 
40A:12A-5(e) would equate “blighted areas” to areas that are not op-
erated in an optimal manner.135  Under such an “all-encompassing 
definition,” the court observed, most property in the state would be 
eligible for redevelopment.136  Chief Justice Zazzali concluded, there-
fore, that the term’s meaning obviously could not extend so far and 
that Paulsboro’s interpretation of section 40A:12A-5(e) was unconsti-
tutional.137
 128 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 455. 
 129 Id. at 454. 
 130 Id. at 456. 
 131 Id. at 459. 
 132 Id. (citing Luce, supra note 10, at 394). 
 133 Id. at 459–60 (citing Luce, supra note 10, at 401, 403). 
 134 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 460 (citing Luce, supra note 10, at 464); see, e.g., Sweet-
water Valley Civic Ass’n. v. Nat’l City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Cal. 1976) (holding that 
“it is not sufficient to merely show that the area is not being put to its optimum use, 
or that the land is more valuable for other uses”). 
 135 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 460. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
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Having found the Borough’s interpretation of the provision un-
constitutional, the court next sought to determine whether the sec-
tion 40A:12A-5(e) is “reasonably susceptible” to any interpretation 
that complies with the New Jersey Constitution.  The Legislature pro-
vided eight criteria for declaring property “in need of redevelop-
ment” under section 40A:12A-5.138  While recognizing that there is 
“some degree of overlap between those criteria,” the court found that 
each subsection “provides, at least to a degree, an independent basis 
for designating the property as ‘in need of redevelopment.’”139  Un-
der Paulsboro’s interpretation of subsection (e), however, the court 
found that subsections (b) and (c) would be entirely subsumed, as 
land that qualifies for redevelopment under (b) or (c) would also 
qualify as “not fully productive” under subsection (e).140  The court, 
seeking to avoid rendering any part of the statute meaningless,141 
identified yet another reason to reject the Borough’s interpretation 
of the statute.142
Consequently, Chief Justice Zazzali asserted that the phrase “or 
other conditions” should be interpreted in accordance with the prin-
ciple of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis: “where gen-
eral words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the gen-
eral words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”143  Under 
that principle, the chief justice found that the phrase, as used in sec-
tion 40A:12A-5(e), “refers to circumstances of the same or like piece 
as conditions of title or diverse ownership.”144  The phrase is not, the 
chief justice proclaimed, “a universal catch-all that refers to any even-
tuality.”145
Moreover, the court asserted that the phrase “stagnant or not 
fully productive” does not create two alternative criteria for making a 
redevelopment designation as the Borough suggested.146  Rather, the 
term “not fully productive” elaborates on “the operative criterion, 
 138 Id. (citing Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor of Princeton, 851 
A.2d 685, 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)).  For a list of the eight criteria, see 
supra note 67. 
 139 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 461. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 592 A.2d 194, 196 (N.J. 1991)). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 461–62 (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (6th ed. 2000)). 
 144 Id. at 462. 
 145 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 462. 
 146 Id. 
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that is, ‘stagnant.’”147  Thus, the court held that the New Jersey Con-
stitution “does not permit government redevelopment of private 
property solely because the property is not used in an optimal man-
ner,” and subsection (e) applies “only to property that has become 
stagnant and unproductive because of issues of title, diversity of own-
ership, or other conditions of the same kind.”148
Because Paulsboro designated the Gallenthin property as “in 
need of redevelopment” based solely on its belief that plaintiffs were 
not utilizing the property in a fully productive manner, the court in-
validated the designation as beyond the scope of subsection (e).149  
The court further noted that the record lacked evidence that the 
Gallenthin property was an integral part of the larger BP/Dow Rede-
velopment Area.150  Chief Justice Zazzali suggested that if such evi-
dence were present, however, the result in this case may have been 
different.151
V. AFTER GALLENTHIN 
The LRHL relaxed the “blighted” standard established by the 
New Jersey Constitution by providing broad criteria that warrant des-
ignation of an area as “in need of redevelopment.”152  In Gallenthin, 
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court continued the state judici-
ary’s recent trend toward restricting eminent domain use and pro-
nounced that the LRHL provisions must be interpreted in a way that 
is consistent with the constitution’s mandate.  According to the court, 
property is not blighted—and therefore cannot be taken for redevel-
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 465. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 464.  The court also responded in dicta to the parties’ 
concerns about the appropriate standard of review for municipal redevelopment des-
ignations.  See id. at 465.  While the plaintiffs argued that the designation in this case 
was not supported by substantial evidence because it was based on the net opinion of 
the Borough’s expert, Paulsboro asserted that the lower courts correctly applied the 
substantial evidence standard.  Id. at 464.  Recognizing that it need not address the 
sufficiency of the evidence on the record, the court offered “brief comments regard-
ing the appropriate standard of review for the future guidance of planning boards 
and courts.”  Id. at 465.  Specifically, the court noted that while municipal redevel-
opment designations are entitled to judicial deference so long as they are supported 
by substantial evidence, the standard is not satisfied if a challenged designation is 
supported only by the net opinion of the municipality’s expert.  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 40A:12A-6(b)(5)).  Generally, the court declared, a municipality must estab-
lish a record containing “more than a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria 
and a declaration that those criteria are met.”  Id. 
 152 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 (West 1992). 
OSTROWSKI (FINAL) 1/28/2009  11:17:46 AM 
2009] COMMENT 245 
 
opment purposes—unless there is “deterioration or stagnation that 
has a decadent effect on surrounding property.”153
While the eminent domain power is limited somewhat by Gallen-
thin’s interpretation of the “blight” requirement, the government still 
maintains a great deal of flexibility in making redevelopment deter-
minations.  Ronald S. Goldsmith, who filed an amicus brief in Gallen-
thin for the New Jersey State League of Municipalities, recognized as 
much, stating that the court’s holding “does not significantly hamper 
redevelopment as long as municipalities base their designations on 
appropriate sections of the Local Redevelopment and Housing 
Law.”154  To be sure, the Gallenthin decision did not invalidate the 
LRHL as a whole.  Nor did it invalidate any of its provisions.  The 
Gallenthin court, in fact, addressed only one subsection of the stat-
ute—namely, the “unproductive use” criteria set forth in section 
40A:12A-5(e).155  In announcing the court’s decision, Chief Justice 
Zazzali also confirmed that a municipality will still be permitted to 
designate unblighted property as “in need of redevelopment” when 
there is evidence that it is necessary for the redevelopment of a larger 
blighted area.156  As such, Gallenthin left several issues undecided.  
The following sections examine how New Jersey courts and legislators 
have reacted to Gallenthin in light of these unanswered questions. 
A. The Judiciary’s Reaction to Gallenthin 
Since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Gallenthin in June 
2007, several lower courts have issued opinions following the high 
court’s lead.  The trend in both trial and appellate courts has been to 
limit municipalities’ power to invoke eminent domain. 
1. Freedman’s Bakery 
In HJB Associates, Inc. v. Council of Belmar,157 an Appellate Division 
court set out to determine whether Belmar’s designation of Freed-
man’s Bakery as “in need of redevelopment” was supported by sub-
stantial, credible evidence.158  With regard to the plaintiff’s property, 
 153 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 460. 
 154 Robert G. Seidenstein, Eminent Domain: ‘Blight’ Loses its Bite, N.J. LAW., June 18, 
2007, at 43. 
 155 See Beenstock, supra note 33, at 2. 
 156 Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 464 (“Paulsboro does not present a situation where the 
subject property is in any way connected to a larger redevelopment plan.  If that were 
the case, the result may have been different.”). 
 157 No. A-6510-05T5, 2007 WL 2005173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2007) 
(per curiam). 
 158 Id. at *1–2. 
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the Borough’s consultant found a “faulty and obsolete layout” that 
purportedly satisfied the criteria set forth in section 40A:12A-5(d).159  
The consultant also reported that contaminated soil on the property 
satisfied subsection (e) under the “other conditions” classification.160  
The Borough’s Planning Board ultimately adopted these findings and 
designated several properties, including the plaintiff’s bakery, as “in 
need of redevelopment.”161
While the trial court dismissed the property owner’s complaint 
challenging the Borough’s designation, the Appellate Division re-
versed.162  Quoting Gallenthin, the court noted that the New Jersey 
Constitution “does not permit government redevelopment of private 
property solely because the property is not used in an optimal man-
ner,”163 but rather limits government redevelopment to “blighted ar-
eas” only.164  The appellate panel held, in light of the Gallenthin deci-
sion, that the Borough failed to establish the criteria required under 
section 40A:12A-5(d) or (e).165  On claims that the plaintiff’s property 
satisfied subsection (d), the court found that the Borough failed to 
provide proof that conditions on the property were “detrimental to 
the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community.”166  Similarly, 
the panel concluded that the presence of soil contamination was in-
sufficient to warrant a redevelopment designation as an “other condi-
tion” under subsection (e).167  Therefore, the court reversed the Law 
 159 Id. at *1.  Recall that subsections (d) and (e) allow a municipality to declare 
property in need of redevelopment if the following criteria are met: 
d. Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapida-
tion, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, 
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land cover-
age, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of 
these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, 
or welfare of the community.   
e. A growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused by 
the condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real property 
therein or other conditions, resulting in a stagnant or not fully 
productive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for 
contributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5(d)–(e) (West 1992). 
 160 HJB Assocs., 2007 WL 2005173, at *1. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at *2. 
 163 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 HJB Assocs., 2007 WL 2005173, at *3. 
 167 Id. at *4. 
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Division’s dismissal and invalidated the Borough’s resolution desig-
nating the plaintiff’s property as “in need of redevelopment.”168
2. The Mulberry Street Decision 
In Mulberry St. Area Property Owner’s Group v. City of Newark,169 a 
group of residents challenged Newark’s declaration that nine 
blocks—including 166 lots located along Mulberry Street—
constituted an area “in need of redevelopment” under the LRHL.170  
After an extensive recitation of the material facts, Judge Marie P. Si-
monelli opined that the City of Newark “should be entitled to utilize 
the tools of redevelopment to allow it to once again take its place as 
the State’s most important and prominent City.”171  However, she con-
tinued, the City was not permitted to do so in the way it had at-
tempted to in this case.172
Relying heavily on Gallenthin, Judge Simonelli noted that “the 
constitutional requirement of blight is not met where the sole basis 
for the redevelopment is that the property is ‘not fully productive.’”173  
Here, the court found that Newark had declared the entire Mulberry 
Street area in need of redevelopment under section 40A:12A-5(e) 
based solely on its belief that most properties in the area were “not 
properly utilized” and could be “put to better use.”174  Furthermore, 
the court asserted that issues of “title, diversity of ownership or other 
conditions of the same kind” did not apply to the Mulberry Street 
area, nor was there any evidence that the area was connected to or 
necessary for rehabilitation of any larger blighted area.175  The court 
concluded that, under such circumstances, Newark’s designation did 
 168 Id. 
 169 No. ESX-L-9916-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 19, 2007). 
 T170 Id. at 1–2.  Controversy regarding the Mulberry Street area began even before 
the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo.  By declaring the neighborhood in 
need of redevelopment in November 2004, the Newark City Council cleared the way 
for a $550 million project, which originally included 2,000 condominium units and 
180,000 square feet of retail space near the recently opened Prudential Center.  See 
Marc Ferris, Redevelopment: A Heated Dispute in Newark, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, § 
14NJ, at 6; Jeffrey C. Mays, Newark Targeting Mulberry St. for Condominium Mega-Project, 
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 4, 2004, at 28. 
 171 Mulberry St., No. ESX-L-9916-04, at 59. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. (citation omitted). 
 174 Id. at 60. 
 175 Id. at 61–62. 
OSTROWSKI (FINAL) 1/28/2009  11:17:46 AM 
248 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:225 
 
“not meet the constitutional requirement of blight” and must there-
fore be invalidated.176
3. Evans and Rivco Group 
Similarly, in Evans v. Township of Maplewood,177 plaintiffs Carolyn 
Evans and Rivco Group, LLC, sought to set aside the inclusion of 
their properties in an area previously designated as “in need of rede-
velopment.”178  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the inclusion of 
their lots was “arbitrary and capricious” because the Township’s de-
termination was not based on substantial evidence in the record.179  
Evans and Rivco further argued that limits on the exercise of eminent 
domain established in Gallenthin, which was decided after the trial in 
their case, ought to prevent Maplewood from including their un-
blighted properties in its redevelopment area under section 40A:12A-
5(e).180  Maplewood and its Planning Board attempted to distinguish 
Gallenthin and asserted that, even if Gallenthin prevented inclusion 
under subsection (e), the plaintiffs’ properties could be included 
under other subsections of the LRHL that the Gallenthin court failed 
to address.181
Notwithstanding the deference given to a municipality’s rede-
velopment designation, the Law Division held that “designating the 
Evans and Rivco properties as in need of redevelopment [was] not 
permissible under the LRHL as limited by Gallenthin.”182  In Part III of 
the decision, Judge Donald Goldman attempted to parse out the 
meaning of “Section 5 after Gallenthin.”183  Because the New Jersey 
Constitution authorizes the exercise of eminent domain for redevel-
opment only in blighted areas, Judge Goldman noted, the Legislature 
could not have authorized municipalities to take properties that are 
not blighted themselves and are not necessary for redevelopment of a 
 176 Id. at 61.  For reactions to Judge Simonelli’s decision in Mulberry Street, see An-
drew Jacobs, Judge Stops Newark Redevelopment Project, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at B3.  
See also Katie Wang, Setback for Newark Condo Project, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 
20, 2007, at 19 [hereinafter Setback for Newark]; Katie Wang, In Newark, a Question of 
Blight or Wrong, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 5, 2007, at 29 [hereinafter Question 
of Blight]. 
 177 No. L-6910-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 27, 2007). 
 178 Id. at 1. 
 179 Id. at 1–2. 
 180 Id. at 2. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 5–6; see also Reginald Roberts, Property Owners Prevail in Lawsuit, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 31, 2007, at 31. 
 183 Evans, No. L-6910-06, at 12. 
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larger blighted area.184  The court held that, in this case, Maplewood’s 
determination that the plaintiffs’ properties met the statutory criteria 
for redevelopment under section 5 “was not based on the presence of 
any condition reasonably described as ‘blight.’”185  Finding no evi-
dence indicating that the properties were dilapidated or beyond re-
pair, or that they had a detrimental effect on surrounding properties, 
Judge Goldman invalidated the Township’s redevelopment designa-
tion.186
4. The LBK Case 
In LBK Associates, LLC v. Borough of Lodi,187 the Appellate Division 
affirmed yet another trial court decision invalidating a redevelop-
ment designation.  A resolution passed by the Borough of Lodi Plan-
ning Board recommended that certain properties owned by the 
plaintiffs, including two trailer parks and several small businesses, be 
designated for redevelopment.188  The Mayor and Council adopted 
the board’s recommendations, which prompted the plaintiffs to file 
complaints in lieu of prerogative writs.189  The trial judge invalidated 
the Borough’s redevelopment designation, finding that it was unsup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record and therefore consti-
tuted “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” action by the board.190
The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no error in the trial 
judge’s determinations.191  Citing Gallenthin, a three-judge panel 
found that after the plaintiffs had demonstrated a lack of substantial 
evidence in support of the designation, the Borough’s actions were 
“no longer entitled to the deference normatively afforded.”192  The 
court left open the possibility, however, that the Borough would be 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 13. 
 186 Id.  Interestingly, the court in Evans also seemed to expand the Gallenthin hold-
ing beyond subsection (e).  The court rejected Maplewood’s argument that section 
40A:12A-5(d) was satisfied in this case, finding that nothing the Township alleged 
showed that the conditions were “detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare 
of the community.”  Id. at 16.  Without such a showing, the court concluded, a rede-
velopment determination under subsection (d) would not “be consistent with Gallen-
thin’s restriction of the use of eminent domain for redevelopment to ‘blighted ar-
eas.’”  Id. at 16–17 (citing Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 
A.2d  447, 460 (N.J. 2007)). 
 187 No. A-1829-05T2, 2007 WL 2089275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24, 2007) 
(per curiam). 
 188 Id. at *1. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
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permitted to begin the process anew, evaluating the properties in 
light of Gallenthin, Kelo, and other recent cases involving eminent 
domain.193
5. Harrison Redevelopment 
In one of the few reported eminent domain decisions since 
Gallenthin, the Appellate Division focused on the validity of the 
LRHL’s notice requirements set forth in New Jersey Statutes Anno-
tated section 40A:12A-6.  Specifically, the court in Harrison Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Derose194 dealt with the issue of whether a property 
owner who fails to challenge a designation affecting his or her prop-
erty within forty-five days of its adoption by a municipal governing 
body (as required by the LRHL) may still challenge, in full or in part, 
the public purpose of the taking.195  The three-judge panel held that 
unless a municipality provides the property owner with contem-
poraneous written notice that fairly alerts the owner that (1) his 
or her property has been designated for redevelopment, (2) the 
designation operates as a finding of public purpose and author-
izes the municipality to acquire the property against the owner’s 
will, and (3) informs the owner of the time limits within which the 
owner may take legal action to challenge that designation, an 
owner constitutionally preserves the right to contest the designa-
tion, by way of affirmative defense to an ensuing condemnation 
action.196
Absent this type of adequate notice, the court proclaimed, the 
owner’s right to raise affirmative defenses is preserved, even beyond 
the statutorily prescribed forty-five days.197
Conversely, the court noted that if the municipality’s notice does 
contain the “constitutionally-essential” due process components, the 
owner may challenge the designation only by bringing an action in 
lieu of prerogative writs within forty-five days of the adoption of the 
designation.198  The court further observed, however, that while an 
owner provided with adequate notice cannot ordinarily wait to raise 
objections as a defense in future condemnation actions, “trial judges 
retain the residual power . . . to extend the time for the assertion of 
all claims of invalidity, where necessary to serve the interests of jus-
 193 LBK Assocs., 2007 WL 2089275, at *1. 
 194 942 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 195 See id. at 62. 
 196 Id. at 62–63. 
 197 Id. at 63. 
 198 Id. 
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tice.”199  Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that 
the notice afforded to the plaintiff property owners was constitution-
ally inadequate and, therefore, the Law Division erred in concluding 
that the property owners’ challenges were time-barred under the 
LRHL.200
B. Legislative Reaction to Gallenthin 
While New Jersey courts have been extremely active, the State 
Legislature has failed to pass any meaningful eminent domain legisla-
tion since Gallenthin.  In fact, at the time this Comment was written, 
no new legislation had even been introduced, as Assembly and Senate 
members continued to consider reform bills introduced in response 
to Kelo. 
1. Assembly Bill 3257 
In June 2006, Assemblymen John J. Burzichelli (D-Gloucester),201 
Robert M. Gordon (D-Bergen), and Christopher “Kip” Bateman (R-
Somerset) introduced perhaps the most sweeping reform bill to date.  
Assembly Bill 3257202 was designed “to ensure that the use of eminent 
domain for redevelopment is an absolute last resort.”203  While the bill 
declares that “redevelopment remains a valid and important public 
purpose,” it also recognizes that “changes to the existing law are nec-
essary.”204
As such, the bill proposes to amend New Jersey Statutes Anno-
tated section 40A:12A-3 by defining various significant terms, includ-
ing “comparable replacement housing” and “detrimental to the 
safety, health, or welfare of the community.”205  The latter phrase, 
which played a major role in the Gallenthin decision, would be de-
fined as follows: 
“Detrimental to the safety, health, or welfare of the community” 
means objective evidence of detriment, including, but not limited 
 199 Id. 
 200 Harrison Redevelopment, 942 A.2d at 63; see also Michael Booth, Condemnation 
Law’s Notice to Owners Falls Short of Due Process, Court Says, N.J. L.J., Mar. 3, 2008, at 1, 
6; Bill DeSantis, Municipalities Need to Go Above and Beyond the Provisions: Owners Can 
Challenge Development Designation in a Condemnation Action, N.J. L.J., June 23, 2008, at 
39. 
 201 Notably, Burzichelli also serves as Paulsboro’s mayor.  See Seidenstein, supra 
note 30, at 31; Dana Sullivan, Eminent Domain in Trenton, N.J. LAW., July 3, 2006, at 1. 
 202 N.J. Assem. 3257, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 203 See Sheridan, supra note 27, at 331 (quoting N.J. Assem. 3257, at 1). 
 204 N.J. Assem. 3257, at 3. 
 205 See id. at 4. 
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to, substantial building or health code violations, excessive police 
activity, a lack of structural integrity, or a continuing exterior ap-
pearance that degrades the surrounding properties.  For com-
mercial properties, the objective evidence of detriment also may 
include a lack of proper utilization of the land or structures that 
leads to stagnant or not fully productive condition of the land.206
Thus, to designate a residential property for redevelopment under 
the new definition, a municipality would be required to present “ob-
jective evidence” that a detriment exists, such as “substantial” code 
violations or a degrading exterior appearance.207  The standard would 
be less stringent for commercial properties, however, as evidence of 
“underutilization” would suffice.208
In addition to defining important terminology, the proposed 
statute would require a municipality to designate an area as “in need 
of redevelopment” by ordinance rather than by a mere resolution.209  
It would also alter the criteria set forth in sections 40A:12A-5(d) and 
(e).210  Moreover, the bill would provide that a developer or redevel-
oper is precluded from conducting or funding any part of the inves-
tigation to determine whether an area meets the criteria set forth in 
section 40A:12A-5.211
The New Jersey Assembly passed Bill 3257 by a 51-18 vote on 
June 22, 2006.212  The Senate, however, has yet to pass any version of 
the bill.213  In fact, Senator Ronald Rice (D-Essex), who sponsored the 
Senate bill, was recently unable to garner enough votes in the Senate 
Community and Urban Affairs Committee to even send the bill for a 
floor vote.214  New Jersey Public Advocate Ronald Chen,215 a major 
 206 Id. 
 207 See id. 
 208 See id.; Sheridan, supra note 27, at 332. 
 209 N.J. Assem. 3257, at 8; see also Sullivan, supra note 201, at 39.  
 210 Id. at 8–9; see infra text accompanying note 220. 
 211 See N.J. Assem. 3257, at 10. 
 212 See Dana E. Sullivan, Eminent Domain Not So Imminent, N.J. LAW., June 4, 2007, at 
7; William J. Ward, Defining Blight: Step One in New Jersey’s Redevelopment Process, N.J. 
L.J., June 25, 2007, at S-4. 
 213 See S. 1975, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006); Sullivan, supra note 84, at 
3 (noting that New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram and Governor Jon Corz-
ine have put pressure on the Senate to pass the bill); Kate Coscarelli, Court Limits 
Towns’ Power to Seize Land, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 14, 2007, at 1. 
 214 Michael Booth, Eminent Domain Compromise Bill, Pleasing No One, Stalls in Senate, 
N.J. L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at 23. 
 215 Since 2006, Chen has been active in advocating for eminent domain reform.  
IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 3.  Chen’s first report on eminent do-
main, released in May 2006, offered several noteworthy recommendations for legisla-
tive reform.  Id.; see also infra Part VI.  A follow-up report highlights particular cases 
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proponent of the Assembly bill, announced that the Senate version is 
too vague,216 and homeowners and small business groups have ex-
pressed their concern that the bill provides inadequate protections 
for property owners.217  Some mayors, on the other hand, argue that 
the Assembly’s version is too restrictive and would hinder their ability 
to rebuild cities.218  Still, some uncertainty remains about how much 
the Assembly bill would actually accomplish.219
One problem with the bill is that its proposed definition of “det-
rimental to the safety, health, or welfare of the community” does little 
more than the present LRHL to protect private property owners from 
government seizures.  The alterations made to subsections (d) and 
(e) would similarly fail to create redevelopment criteria that are ade-
quately concrete.  The revised subsections would allow a municipality 
to designate an area as “in need of redevelopment” if the following 
conditions are found: 
d. Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of di-
lapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, or any combination 
of these or similar conditions are determined to be detri-
mental to the safety, health, or welfare of the community. 
e. A lack of proper utilization of areas caused by the condition 
of the title, diverse ownership of the real property therein or 
other conditions which, by virtue of these factors are deter-
mined to be detrimental to the safety, health, or welfare of 
the community.220 
that evidence “misuse of the redevelopment process.”  IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, 
supra, at 2.  In large part due to his efforts to prevent abuse and misuse of the emi-
nent domain power, Chen was recently named “Lawyer of the Year” for 2007 by the 
New Jersey Law Journal.  See Mary Pat Gallagher, Pundit for Eminent Domain Reform: 
New Jersey’s Public Advocate is the Draftsman of the State’s New Hard Line Against Arbitrary 
Takings for Redevelopment, N.J. L.J., Dec. 31, 2007, at 1, 4. 
 216 Booth, supra note 214, at 23. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Sullivan, supra note 212, at 7. 
 219 See Geneslaw & Peticolas, supra note 25, at 1; Sheridan, supra note 27, at 332; 
Sullivan, supra note 201, at 39. 
 220 N.J. Assem. 3257, at 8–9.  The proposed language can be compared to the cur-
rent statute, which provides: 
d. Areas with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapida-
tion, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, 
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land cover-
age, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of 
these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, 
or welfare of the community. 
e. A growing lack or total lack of proper utilization of areas caused by 
the condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real property 
therein or other conditions, resulting in a stagnant or not fully 
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By removing the “stagnant or not fully productive” language from 
subsection (e), the bill would merely codify what the New Jersey Su-
preme Court already held in Gallenthin.  Moreover, even under the 
revised subsections, the redevelopment criteria remain too broad. 
A second problem with the bill is that it would allow redevelop-
ment even when twenty percent of the designated area fails to meet 
the proposed “objective” tests.221  Under this exception, most of the 
plaintiffs in Kelo still would have been subject to the eminent domain 
takings.222  As part of the larger BP/Dow Redevelopment Area, the 
plaintiffs in Gallenthin also may have fallen under the twenty-percent 
exception.  The bill’s final paragraph further states that the legisla-
tion would “grandfather existing redevelopment activities to the ex-
tent such activities are matured.”223  This language indicates that any 
redevelopment designation or plan conceived before the proposed 
statute is enacted would be immune from the legislative changes. 
Finally, Assembly Bill 3257 could have an adverse effect on in-
dustrial property owners because it allows municipalities to designate 
as “in need of redevelopment” any property left “vacant or substan-
tially underutilized” for twenty-four months due to environmental 
contamination.224  One scholar predicts that because remediation ef-
forts often take longer than two years to complete, the proposal 
would discourage investment in contaminated land.225
2. Assembly Bills 2423 and 3178 
In February 2006, Assemblywoman Charlotte Vandervalk (R-
Bergen) and Assemblyman Upendra J. Chivukula (D-Somerset) in-
troduced Assembly Bill 2423.226  The bill proposed a four-year mora-
torium on the use of eminent domain “when the primary purpose for 
the taking is economic development that will ultimately result in 
ownership of that property being vested in another private person.”227  
productive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for 
contributing to and serving the public health, safety and welfare. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5(d)–(e) (West 1992). 
 221 N.J. Assem. 3257, at 9–10; see also Sheridan, supra note 27, at 332. 
 222 Sheridan, supra note 27, at 332. 
 223 See N.J. Assem. 3257, at 33. 
 224 N.J. Assem. 3257, at 9. 
 225 Geneslaw & Peticolas, supra note 25, at 1. 
 226 N.J. Assem. 2423, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 227 Id. at 4.  Like Assembly Bill No. 3143, the bill would also establish the Eminent 
Domain Study Commission, charged with examining “the use, procedure and appli-
cation of eminent domain in the State” and recommending legislation to discourage 
eminent domain abuse.  Id. 
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Assembly Bill 3178, introduced by Assemblyman Michael J. Panter (D-
Monmouth), proposed a similar two-year moratorium.228  While nei-
ther moratorium bill gained adequate legislative support, some local 
attorneys and scholars encouraged the idea.229  A moratorium seems 
unnecessary at this juncture, however, because the New Jersey Legis-
lature has proven that it will seriously consider the complicated issues 
involved in reform, rather than enacting “knee-jerk” legislation as 
seen in various other states.230
3. Assembly Bill 3143 
In May 2006, Assemblyman Steve Corodemus (R-Monmouth) in-
troduced Assembly Bill 3143, which would establish a permanent 
commission to hold annual hearings throughout the state.231  The 
aptly named Eminent Domain Study Commission would also report 
on eminent domain issues and offer recommendations to the gover-
nor and legislature for changes to the law.232  In addition to creating 
and empowering the commission, the bill would require a declaratory 
judgment from the superior court whenever an area is determined to 
be “in need of redevelopment” and whenever a redevelopment plan 
is adopted.233  The latter requirement has considerable merit.  In the-
ory, at least, it would cut costs for both property owners and redevel-
opment entities as redevelopment designations almost inevitably lead 
to litigation.234
Assembly Bill 3143 would also require that “just compensation” 
for a condemned property include a payment representing compen-
sation for certain intangible benefits of the property, such as ocean, 
river, or mountain views, or other similar quality-of-life factors.235  
There may be a valuation problem with such a measure as the signifi-
cance of these factors is inherently subjective.  It is likely for this rea-
 228 N.J. Assem. 3178, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 229 See Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31 (reporting that the New Jersey Coalition 
Against Eminent Domain Abuse supported the moratorium); Michels, supra note 16, 
at 528 (suggesting that a moratorium would “allow time for the federal and state leg-
islatures to address the true impact of the Kelo decision . . . as opposed to . . . hastily 
enact[ing] legislation that may prove too restrictive on the eminent domain power in 
the future”). 
 230 See, e.g., Seidenstein, supra note 30, at 31 (noting one attorney’s belief that New 
Jersey’s “nuanced” approach to eminent domain problems compares favorably to 
other states’ “knee-jerk” reactions to Kelo). 
 231 N.J. Assem. 3143, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006). 
 232 Id. at 11. 
 233 See id. at 9. 
 234 See infra Part VI.C. 
 235 Assem. 3143, at 11. 
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son that courts have rejected deviations from the fair market value 
approach, which is typically accepted as sufficient to meet the “just 
compensation” requirement.236  As discussed in Part VI, however, in-
creased compensation may be the key to effective eminent domain 
reform. 
VI. THE FUTURE OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW JERSEY AND 
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Gallenthin, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized that the power to use eminent domain for redevelopment is a 
“valuable tool for municipalities faced with economic deterioration in 
their communities.”237  Eminent domain is particularly important in 
New Jersey, which has a quickly growing population, a shrinking 
amount of land available for new housing and commercial develop-
ment, and various cities and municipalities clearly in need of rede-
velopment.238  Moreover, even when municipalities refrain from exer-
cising eminent domain, the mere existence of the takings power 
facilitates productive negotiations between property owners and pri-
vate redevelopers.239
Municipalities and other entities, however, should use eminent 
domain only as a last resort.  The New Jersey judiciary has done its 
part to facilitate this goal by beginning to curtail the use of eminent 
domain in the redevelopment context,240 and will likely continue this 
trend as new cases arise.  The onus is now on the Legislature to take 
action.  Reform legislation should be aimed at protecting New Jersey 
property owners and ensuring that the government invokes its emi-
nent domain power only when property is absolutely necessary for a 
 236 See infra Part VI.A. 
 237 Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460 (N.J. 
2007).  Ronald Chen similarly recognizes that  the “redevelopment of truly blighted 
areas is a legitimate public purpose that serves the greater good by helping revitalize 
communities and create more opportunities for residents.”  REFORMING THE USE OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 4. 
 238 See REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 4 (noting that 
New Jersey is already “the most densely populated state in America”); see also Reader 
Forum, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 11, 2007, at 14.  Diane Brake, president of 
the Regional Planning Partnership, believes that “New Jersey is on track to become 
the first completely built-out state” and that a good way to prevent urban sprawl is to 
“revitalize struggling cities and towns.”  Id. 
 239 Sullivan, supra note 28, at 3. 
 240 See supra Part V.A.  Note also that some New Jersey municipalities, such as Un-
ion Township, have taken the initiative to limit eminent domain use on their own.  
Union Center Won’t Use Eminent Domain, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 7, 2007, at 
52. 
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public good and cannot be acquired through other reasonable 
means.  The following recommendations are offered with those ob-
jectives in mind. 
A. Increase “Just Compensation” 
Perhaps the most significant factor underlying the eminent do-
main controversy is money.  Under both the New Jersey and U.S. 
Constitutions, the government must pay “just compensation” to 
property owners whose land is taken through eminent domain.241  
Typically, “fair market value” has been found to satisfy the just com-
pensation requirement.242  The crux of the problem, however, is that 
“fair market value” fails to take into account the subjective value that 
home and business owners often attach to their property.243  In addi-
tion, compensation calculated using this standard often amounts to 
so little that displaced owners are unable to relocate within the same 
town or community.244  For these reasons, legislative reform efforts 
must focus on ensuring that those affected by eminent domain are 
afforded increased compensation for their losses. 
One way to accomplish this goal is to require payment based on 
“replacement value.”245  Under this alternative to the fair market 
value approach, municipalities would be required to pay a displaced 
property owner’s cost of relocation—that is, the cost to place the 
property owner in a structure of “similar size and quality under com-
parable conditions” and within the same community.246  The level of 
compensation could also be adjusted to cover attorneys’ fees, loss or 
damage to personal property, and other consequential damages that 
 241 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 20. 
 242 See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1934); United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913); see also Mark D. Mako & 
Maulik Shah, Kelo and the States of (and on) Development, N.J. LAW., Apr. 3, 2006, at 
A16. 
 243 See Brief for American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 27, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) 
[hereinafter Brief for American Planning Association] (describing subjective value 
that individual owners attach to their properties as “the most obvious shortfall” of the 
fair market value test). 
 244 The majority in Kelo recognized this problem and suggested during oral argu-
ment that the appropriate measure for just compensation might not be market value.  
See Mako & Shah, supra note 242, at A16. 
 245 REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 20. 
 246 See Mako & Shah, supra note 242, at A16.  Ronald Chen identifies “adequate 
relocation assistance” as a key element of legislative reform.  IN NEED OF 
REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 16, 23–25. 
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often result from eminent domain takings.247  For a displaced busi-
ness, compensation might also include loss of good will.248
Another alternative, which New Jersey legislators have already 
proposed,249 is to require municipalities to pay fair market value plus 
the additional value of certain intangible benefits, “such as an ocean, 
river, or mountain view . . . and other similar quality of life factors.”250  
This measure might also include sentimental value for owners who 
can prove, for example, that they were born in their home or that 
their ancestors built the home.  Concededly, compensation based on 
such subjective factors would involve certain valuation issues.  On 
balance, however, any difficulty regarding valuation would be out-
weighed by the fact that the compensation award would be much 
closer to the actual value of the property to its owner.  Nonetheless, 
the valuation issues have thus far been enough to prevent both the 
state judiciary and the state legislature from deviating from the fair 
market value approach.251
A final way to ensure increased compensation for property own-
ers would be to specify the valuation date for condemned property.  
In New Jersey, this issue was most recently raised in Mt. Laurel v. 
Stanley,252 which focused on whether and when a governmental con-
demnation action begins to “substantially affect[] the use and enjoy-
ment of . . . property.”253  In Stanley, the Township used December 3, 
1997—the date on which the “judgment of repose” was entered—for 
the purpose of valuing the plaintiffs’ property.254  On that date, the 
property was appraised at $833,000, which Mt. Laurel deposited into 
 247 See Brief for American Planning Association, supra note 243, at 5. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See N.J. Assem. 3143, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess., at 11 (N.J. 2006). 
 250 Id.  The American Planning Association has suggested that subjective value 
may be derived from various sources, including modifications that owners have made 
to property to suit their personal needs and preferences, friendships that owners 
have formed in a particular neighborhood, and the feeling of security that accompa-
nies being in familiar surroundings.  See Brief for American Planning Association, 
supra note 243, at 27.  The Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force similarly recom-
mended legislation that would allow courts to take several factors, including “heri-
tage value,” into account when determining just compensation.  See MISSOURI 
EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.mo.gov/mo/eminentdomain/finalrpt.pdf. 
 251 Note, however, that the New Jersey Senate has considered substituting “prevail-
ing market rates” for “fair market value” because the latter is often viewed as insuffi-
cient.  Booth, supra note 214, at 23. 
 252 885 A.2d 440 (N.J. 2005); see also Robert G. Seidenstein, Eminent Domain: Little 
Guys Win One, N.J. LAW., Nov. 28, 2005, at 1. 
 253 Stanley, 885 A.2d at 441 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-30(c) (West 1992)). 
 254 Id. at 442. 
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an account to be used for the taking.255  The Appellate Division 
found, however, that the proper date for valuation purposes was May 
8, 2002—the date on which Mount Laurel filed its condemnation 
complaint after negotiations with the Stanleys failed.256  By the later 
date, the property was valued at $1.5 million, resulting in a victory 
worth several hundred thousand dollars for the property owners.257
Requiring increased compensation would undoubtedly make 
certain redevelopment projects financially imprudent for private re-
developers.258  Such a requirement, however, would be immeasurably 
beneficial for property owners whose houses and businesses become 
the subject of eminent domain takings.  In addition, an increased 
compensation scheme would likely reduce litigation by encouraging 
municipalities and other redevelopment entities to negotiate with 
property owners to reach a fair compensation package prior to initiat-
ing eminent domain proceedings.259  As the eminent domain power 
would be invoked only when property owners acted unreasonably in 
holding out in such negotiations, the increased compensation 
scheme would also further the goal of maintaining eminent domain 
as a last resort. 
B. Implement a More Exacting Designation Process 
Under the current version of the LRHL, it is relatively easy for 
municipalities to designate private property as “in need of redevel-
opment.”260  According to New Jersey Public Advocate Ronald Chen’s 
May 2006 report, the statutory criteria set forth in section 40A:12A-5 
provides “virtually no limitation on taking private property for rede-
velopment.”261  In the same report, Chen made the following state-
ment mirroring Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo: 
Drumthwacket, the Governor’s official residence, is a “stately 
home” that is “one of the most fabled and elegant of America’s 
 255 Seidenstein, supra note 252, at 12. 
 256 Stanley, 885 A.2d at 443. 
 257 Seidenstein, supra note 252, at 12.  New Jersey Assembly Bill 3143 would 
change the date of valuation from the earliest of several events specified in the LRHL 
to the latest to ensure that property owners get maximum value for their property in 
situations where valuation is an issue.  N.J. Assem. 3143, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess., 
at 4 (N.J. 2006). 
 258 REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 19. 
 259 The Missouri Eminent Domain Task Force goes as far as to recommend that 
private buyers should be required to negotiate in good faith prior to the entry of an 
order for condemnation and should be penalized if bad faith is shown.  MISSOURI 
EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, supra note 250, at 18. 
 260 See supra text accompanying notes 57–81. 
 261 REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 13. 
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executive residences,” . . . yet the property could also be consid-
ered “not fully productive” because a hotel or apartment house 
catering to hundreds, for instance, would be a more productive 
use of the property.262
While the Gallenthin decision seems to eliminate the possibility that 
Drumthwacket could actually be seized solely because it is “not fully 
productive,” Chen’s observation is still persuasive.  Reform legislation 
should create a more rigorous designation process, which would pro-
vide various benefits for both property owners and condemnation en-
tities. 
First, the text of the LRHL should be amended to reflect the 
court’s decision in Gallenthin and to ensure that appropriate limits 
are placed on the power of municipalities to designate private prop-
erty as “in need of redevelopment.”  The “not fully productive” and 
“lack of proper utilization” language found in section 40A:12A-5(e) 
ought to be removed because it is both too broad and too vague.  
Among other changes, New Jersey Assembly Bill 3257 proposes to 
eliminate the “not fully productive” criterion.263  At the same time, 
however, the bill would abolish the need to show a “growing” or “to-
tal” lack of proper utilization and would, instead, require a munici-
pality to show a mere “lack of proper utilization . . . caused by the 
condition of the title, diverse ownership of the real property therein 
or other condition.”264  Ideally, reform legislation should make the 
redevelopment designation criteria both less ambiguous and more 
stringent. 
Second, the provisions requiring notice to property owners af-
fected by redevelopment designations should be altered, as they are 
currently inadequate.265  Ronald Chen suggests that reform legislation 
should require notice to property owners and tenants written in plain 
language and delivered via certified or regular mail at least sixty days 
prior to the first designation hearing.266  Another way to effectively 
ensure that residents receive adequate notice would be to require 
municipalities to adopt redevelopment plans by ordinance rather 
 262 Id. at xi. 
 263 See N.J. Assem. 3257, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess. (N.J. 2006); see also supra Part 
V.B.1. 
 264 See N.J. Assem. 3257, at 8–9. 
 265 Ronald Chen, N.J. Dep’t of the Public Advocate, Summary of Public Advocate Le-
gal Actions, http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/public/pdf/PaulsboroDecision 
Summary0507.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).  For individuals who rent the property 
on which they reside, no notice is required at all.  Id. 
 266 See REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 15; IN NEED OF 
REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 24. 
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than by resolution.267  Such a requirement would entail further public 
hearings to determine whether an area is blighted at which affected 
residents would have the opportunity to question the experts present-
ing on behalf of the municipality.268  Property owners should also be 
permitted to present their own evidence to show that an area is not, 
in fact, blighted.269  Allowing property owners to challenge a designa-
tion during the initial stages of the redevelopment process would not 
only promote justice and fairness but would also reduce litigation 
costs.  Both property owners and municipalities would likely prefer to 
avoid long legal battles over redevelopment designations, which 
sometimes continue even after the redevelopment project has be-
gun.270
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Cynwyd, the gov-
ernment’s authority to exercise eminent domain is one of its “most 
awesome powers.”271  Property owners need to be protected against 
abuses of this power starting from the first step of the redevelopment 
process—the blight designation.  Reform legislation should therefore 
seek to modify the statutory criteria for designating an area as “in 
need of redevelopment” to make them as concrete as possible.  Legis-
lators must also work to ensure that property owners are both fully in-
formed of their rights and responsibilities from an early stage in the 
process and afforded a fair opportunity to challenge blight designa-
tions without lengthy and expensive litigation. 
C. Shift the Burden 
Under New Jersey’s current statutory scheme, the standard of 
proof necessary to sustain a municipality’s blight designation is ex-
tremely low—it must be supported only by “substantial evidence.”272  
Perhaps more importantly, property owners who challenge a munici-
 267 For an example of this type of proposal, see N.J. Assem. 3257, at 8. 
 268 Chen, supra note 265. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id.  Note that the court’s decision in the Harrison Redevelopment case clarifies 
the notice provisions set forth in section 6 of the LRHL, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6 
(West 1992), imposing a more stringent burden on municipalities and enhancing 
the right of property owners to challenge redevelopment designations if the notice 
they receive is inadequate.  See supra Part V.A.5.  Specifically, the court’s ruling re-
lieves property owners from the “burdens of engaging in premature litigation” and 
from forcing them to litigate issues before receiving fair and adequate notice of a 
municipality’s adverse redevelopment designation determination.  Harrison Rede-
velopment Agency v. Derose, 942 A.2d 59, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 271 City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J. 1997). 
 272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6(b)(5) (West 1992); see also IN NEED OF 
REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 15; supra text accompanying notes 69–72. 
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pality’s redevelopment designation are faced with the burden of prov-
ing that the designation was not supported by such evidence.273  De-
scribed another way, redevelopment designations are entitled to a 
presumption of validity.274  To counteract this “overwhelming pre-
sumption in the case law which favors the validity of municipal ac-
tion,”275 the burden of persuasion should be shifted to municipalities 
to justify designation of an area as “in need of redevelopment.” 
New Jersey Senate Majority Leader Bernard Kenny, Jr., claims 
that “[c]hanging the burden of proof will paralyze the state and mu-
nicipalities in being able to develop their properties in accordance 
with the economic conditions at the time.”276  According to the Public 
Advocate, however, if an area is truly blighted, the municipality 
should not have very much trouble satisfying the burden.277  Current 
New Jersey law makes it easy for municipalities and other entities to 
designate private property as part of a redevelopment area and then 
protects those designations from being reversed by the trial court.  In 
this way, the law fails to protect the most vulnerable parties involved 
in the process—the property owners.  Reform legislation should rem-
edy this problem by shifting the burden to the prospective condem-
nor to prove that the property in question satisfies the relevant statu-
tory criteria. 
D. Impose Stricter “Pay-to-Play” Restrictions 
As it currently stands, New Jersey law permits a private corpora-
tion to foot the bill for a municipality’s blight investigations.278  In ad-
dition, these redevelopment corporations may provide campaign 
contributions to local governmental officials and subsequently receive 
lucrative redevelopment contracts.279  While the Local Government 
Ethics Law280 prohibits some of the potential conflicts that may arise 
 273 See Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1971) (citing Wil-
son v. Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 854 (N.J. 1958)); IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, su-
pra note 29, at 16. 
 274 Levin, 274 A.2d at 18. 
 275 William J. Ward, N.J. Public Advocate’s Role Essential to Eminent Domain Reform, 
New Jersey Eminent Domain Law Blog, http://www.njeminentdomain.com/state-of-
new-jersey-nj-public-advocates-role-essential-to-eminent-domain-reform.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2008) (citing Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor of Prince-
ton, 851 A.2d 685, 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Chen, supra note 265. 
 279 Id. 
 280 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25 (West 1992). 
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in the redevelopment context,281 official misconduct, or at least the 
appearance of such impropriety, still raises concerns among many 
New Jersey property owners.  Near the end of the Mulberry Street deci-
sion,282 Judge Simonelli addressed this issue, commenting, in dicta, 
that there was evidence that the Mulberry Street Redevelopment Pro-
ject and the Newark Redevelopment Corporation’s role as developer 
was “‘a done deal,’ a fait accompli, before the required statutory rede-
velopment process began.”283
As various arguably unethical practices are currently permitted—
or, at least, not expressly prohibited—by state law, legislators should 
craft legislation designed to prevent “the actuality or appearance of 
corruption which may result when property is purchased or acquired 
for development or redevelopment” through eminent domain.284  As-
sembly Bill 2812, introduced by Assemblyman (now Senator) Bill 
Baroni (R-Mercer) in March 2006, would effectively prohibit indi-
viduals, businesses, and other organizations that have made campaign 
contributions from purchasing or otherwise acquiring rights to de-
velop or redevelop property through condemnation proceedings.285  
However, reform legislation should go even further, prohibiting 
commercial redevelopers from paying for blight determination re-
ports, imposing stricter “pay-to-play” restrictions on all local redevel-
opment projects, and preventing government officials from receiving 
direct financial benefits from redevelopment projects with which they 
are involved.286  Enacting and enforcing these types of reform will 
help alleviate property owners’ concerns about corruption and eradi-
cate New Jersey’s reputation for unabashed eminent domain abuse. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain is a powerful governmental tool that has been 
broadly permitted in New Jersey for decades.  The New Jersey Su-
 281 See IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 18–19. 
 282 See supra Part V.A.2. 
 283 Mulberry St. Area Property Owner’s Group v. City of Newark, No. ESX-L-9916-
04, at 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 19, 2007); see also Wang, Setback for Newark, su-
pra note 176, at 19 (referring to Judge Simonelli’s comments as “stinging criticism at 
the snug relationship between developers and officials in the city”).  In his most re-
cent report, Ronald Chen also highlights various cases that potentially raise concerns 
“about whether public officials had an impermissible special interest in the out-
come.”  IN NEED OF REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 18–20. 
 284 N.J. Assem. 2812, 212th Leg., 2006–2007 Sess., at 4 (N.J. 2006). 
 285 Id.  The bill also forbids an individual who, or a business or organization that, 
has purchased or acquired property through eminent domain proceedings from 
making any campaign contribution for three years thereafter.  Id. 
 286 REFORMING THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 26, at 3, 22. 
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preme Court’s decision in Gallenthin, however, is indicative of the 
modern trend away from this historically broad authorization of emi-
nent domain use.  It is undoubtedly a step in the right direction for 
property owners.  Nonetheless, the New Jersey Legislature still must 
enact reform legislation designed to protect property owners’ rights 
and to ensure that the eminent domain power is used only as a last 
resort.  At minimum, reform legislation should include (1) “just 
compensation” measures that are more favorable to New Jersey prop-
erty owners; (2) a more exacting designation process that protects 
private property rights and makes it more difficult for municipalities 
and redevelopment agencies to designate property as “in need of re-
development”; (3) a burden shift requiring municipalities and other 
redevelopment agencies to prove that designated property actually 
satisfies the relevant statutory criteria; and (4) stricter ethical limita-
tions designed to prevent corruption and other forms of eminent 
domain abuse.  In the interim, the state judiciary should continue the 
trend towards narrowing the definition of “blight” and should closely 
examine all redevelopment designations to make certain that mu-
nicipalities and other condemnation agencies do not transgress their 
proper authority. 
